This project employed multi-disciplinary field research in 2018-19 and 2021-24 throughout all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, covering over 15,000 km by road, which studied the (re)construction of heritage sites after the massive desruction of sacral structures during the war of 1992-95.  The major conclusion is that religious sites have been built anew strategically, not to restore “heritage” so much as to demonstrate local domination by one religious community, or to mark the perimeters of larger areas of control by each of them.  

Such competitive and even antagonistic rebuilding reflects the social fact that the  population is almost completely divided on ethno-religious grounds.  By the 2013 census, 96% of the population self-identified as members of one of three separate communities: Bosniaks as Bosnian-speaking Muslims, Croats as Croatian-speaking Roman Catholics, Serbs as Serbian-speaking Orthodox Christians. There is almost no intermarriage between members of these communities.  Correspondingly, voting is overwhelmingly on these ethno-religious lines, with no major parties drawing many voters from members of more than one such community except occasionally locally.

Ethno-religious territorial divisions within the country are greater even than they were at  the end of the war, with few towns and settlements remaining that have substantial numbers of members of more than one ethno-religious community.  Local dominance in cities, towns and smaller settlements is indicated by religion-specific monuments to dead soldiers who fought in three different armies.  Monuments to soldiers killed in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina are usually memorialized with Koranic verses and often as “Martyrs of Islam;” the dead of the Croatian Defense Council as “defenders of the Croat Homeland” using Roman Catholic imagery and the Latin script; and those killed in the Army of the Republika Srpska as “fighters for the Serbian Fatherland,” using Orthodox Christian imagery and the Cyrillic script.   There are almost no memorials to all those killed in the war, and no such memorial exists in the capital, Sarajevo.

This deeply divided country is nevertheless potentially stable, because these ethno-territorial communities at varying scales are linked by practical infrastructure that facilitates transportation, communication and economic links between them, and the highly decentralized political system agreed to at Dayton in 1995 ensures that each community can protect its vital interests while also having jurisdiction over almost all spheres of governance.  However, this stability may be threatened by European and US efforts to impose central governmental competencies not included within the Dayton peace settlement and largely opposed by Croats and Serbs, as explained below.

Major findings detailed:

Near-total Ethno-territorial Division:

1. Bosnia-Herzegovina is almost completely divided ethno-territorially, on varying scales.  There are very few cities, towns or settlements that are not dominated by a single ethno-religious community: Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats (Roman Catholics), Serbs (Orthodox Christians).  These are heritage communities, based on kinship and shared customs, not religiosity.
2. Local dominance of each community is indicated:
   1. by the size and centrality of its sacral buidings (mosques, churches)
   2. By the central memorial in any settlement to those kiled in the war.  There are almost no monuments anywhere to all those killed in the war, but rather either to Martyrs of Islam (šehidi) of the overwhelmingly Bosniak Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or to “defenders” of the Croat Homeland who fought for the Croatian Defense Council; or “fighters” for the Serbian Fatherland who fought in the Army of the Republika Srpska.  Thus nearly all memorials commemorate the dead of only one army, which fought for different countries, since neither the Croat Homeland or the Serb Fatherland was Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3. The ethno-territorial divison is only partly a result of forced population movements during the war, so-called “ethnic cleansing.”  Despite international efforts from 1996-2006 to foster returns of people to places from which they had been expelled, many people moved after the war to places dominated by their own communities.  Similar movments of populations have taken place during and after other wars in the region since at least the late 19th century.
4. While there is still talk about “returns” of people to places where they lived before 1992, many and perhaps even most such returns now are in coffins, people wanting to be buried in the places they had grown up in.
5. There are almost no marriages between members of different religious communties.  Even in Sarajevo, supposedly the most liberal city, 98% of Bosniak women marry Bosniak men.

Ethno-Political Division

6. The political parties that gain the vast majority of votes are ethno-religious.  Bosniaks vote overwhelmingly for Bosniak parties, Croats for Croat parties, Serbs for Serb parties.  This was the pattern in the 1990 elections as Yugoslavia was failing, and in every election since, with occasional local exceptions.  But it was also the pattern in every relatively free and fair election ever held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since 1910.

Political Stability under the Dayton Agreement

7. The Constitution for Bosnia & Herzegoviona created by the Dayton Peace Agreement structured a highly decentralized state.  While cumbersome, this state has functioned and has facilitated the creation of important practical infrastructures linking the ethno-territories of the country.  This configuration of ethno-religious territories linked by functional infrastructure is inherently stable so long as the dominance of any community in its own territory is not threatened. Efforts to impose central authorities not agreed to at Dayton are likely to be seen as constituting such threats.

Ethno-Religiously Divided Territories Linked by Succcessful Practical Infrastructures

8. Since the end of the war, officials of the international community have facilitated  creating practical infrastructures that facilitate free movement, economic transactions and commuications between the citizens of B&H, divided as they are in ethno-territories.  These include:
   1. A unified currency, the konvertibilna marka, fixed at 0.5 Euros;
   2. Vehicle license platesthat do not identify the location of registration and thus can be from anywhere in B&H;
   3. A growing system of highways.  These are constructed by the authorities of each entity but on a unified plan, similar to the US interstate highways being constructed by each state government;
   4. Three postal companies, each operating in the territory controlled by one ethno-national community.  Thus BH Pošta operates in territories controlled by Bosniaks, Pošta (originally Hrvatska Pošta Mostar) in Croat-controlled territories, and Pošta Srpska in Republika Srpska.  However, these three postal services are linkedso that communications go freely between them.
   5. Three major providers of internet and cellular phone services, one dominant in Bosniak areas, another in Croat areas, the third in Republika Srpska.  These electronic communications providers are linked so that cellular phone service coverage throughout B&His treated the same.
   6. Four providers of electrical power (one for Bosniak-dominated territory, one for  Croat-dominated territory and one for Republika Srpska, Brčko District also having its own), but a largely unified power grid.
   7. Railroad services linked throughout the country.

Partially unsuccessful practical infrastructure:

9. In 2013, European Union attempted to facilitate the first census of since the year before the war began, 1991.  Though the census law specified that it was to enumerate actual residents, EU officials eventually acceded to Bosniak demands that the international standard mechanisms used detect reporting of non-residents as residents not be used.  The Republika Srpska insisted on using these standard international mechanisms.  The result is that the 2013 census has two official population statistics, one accepted in the Federation and by the European Union, the other, arguably more accurate, by the Republika Srpska.Thus there is no figure on the population of Bosnia-Herzeogvina accepted throughout the country.  On the other hand the statistical insitutes continue to do high-quality work, based on their separate results from the 2013 census data.

Unsuccesful Symbolic Infrastructures

10. While practical infrastructure linking the Bosniak, Croat and Serb ethno-territories within the country have succeeded, international efforts to create symbols of a single Bosnian-Herzegovinian identity have largely failed, in that they are not well accepted in all parts of the country.
    1. State flag: the state flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina was imposed by the international High Representative in 1998, and was designed to resemble the European Union flag while avoiding reference to any national symbol in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  While this flag is embraced by the Bosniaks and largely accepted by Croats (usually in connection with their own national flag) it is rarely flown in Republika Srpska, which has its own flag.
    2. National holidays: the only holidays celebrated throughout the country are for New Years, Jan 1 and 2; and Labor Day, May 1 and 2.  An Independence Day recognized in the Federation of BiH but mainly celebrated by Bosniaks and by many foreign missions, is completely ignored in Republika Srpska.  The Republika Srpska’s Republic Day has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of BiH on the odd reasoning that since it is also a minor saint’s day in the Orthodox Church, it cannot be a secular holiday – a ruling rejected by the RS.  Other holidays are also celebrated by only one or at most two of the three constituent peoples. Bosniaks also celebrate Muslim religious holidays, Croats Roman Catholic ones (Gregorian calendar) and Serbs, Orthodox Christian ones (Julian calendar).