Most presentations of the population of Bosnia & Herzegovina focus on the ethno-national distribution of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, and usually are presented by municipality (općina/ opština), as here. This is done because the population is strongly divided into these communities, with over 96% of the population declaring themselves to belong to one of them in the census of 2013. And the difficulty is that they vote this way, as seen below, from the elections at the end of communism, in 1990. But similar voting patterns occurred in every other relatively free and fair election ever held in B&H, from 1910 until the present. The names of the communities have shifted, likewise of the parties, but the results are strikingly stable: Bosniaks, nee Muslims, voting for a Bosniak/ Muslim party, Croats, nee Catholics, for a Croat party, Serbs, nee Orthodox Christians, for a Serb party, as shown below.
This political partitioning was followed 18 months later by the war between Bosniak, Croat and Serb miitary forces, directed by the politicians who had been elected in 1990. The war led to forced movements of populations that transformed the ethnic map, not only displacing millions but consolidating the concetrations of the three primary communities, so that the balances between them in many places became increasingly weighted for only one community, as shown below.
Relative ethno-religious majorities majorities by municipality 1991 (left) and 2013 (right); darkest shade is 2/3 majority. Source: Statistika.ba.
These changes in the distribution of the population led Academician Mirko Pejanović of the University of Sarajevo to conclude in a 2017 article that the result of the 1992-95 wars was that “Prema Popisu stanovništva Bosne i Hercegovine iz 2013. godine, dvije trećine opština imaju jednonacionalnu strukturu u postotku od 70% do 99%,” and that “Uslijed takvog društvenog kretanja na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine su oblikovana područja sa dovršenom etničkom teritorijalizacijom. Ona se javljaju u vidu Republike Srpske za Srbe, zatim u vidu pet kantona za Bošnjake: Tuzlanski, Unskosanski, Sarajevski, Zeničko-dobojski i Bosansko-podrinjski. Za hrvatski narod kao etnički teritorijalizirani prostor iskazuje u: Zapadnohercegovački, Hercegbosanski i Posavski kanton.”
(Source: M. Pejanović, “Promjena Etničke Strukture Opština u Bosni i Hercegoviniprema Popisu Stanovništva 2013. Godine.” Pregled - časopis za društvena pitanja 2017Vol. 58 Issue 1: 1-26)
2. Ethnic Territoriality on Varying Scales
Academician Pejanović’s conclusion is certainly valid at the levels of the municipalities throughout B&H, the RS and the Kantons in the FBH. Yet we think a different picture emerges when one compares the ethno-national divisions by municipality with those settlement [check definition in 2013 census], as below:
Ethno-religious majorities 2013 census by municipality (left) and settlement
For example, what looks like a string of solidly Croat-majority municipalities in central Bosnia become much more complicated when seen at the settlement level:
Croat majorities in central Bosnia municipalities of Vitez, Busovača, Kiseljak and Kreševo (left, blue); at settlement level (right, orange).
The continuity of Croat-majority settlements is tenuous or even interrupted by Bosniak-majority settlements. And in fact, in 1993-94, the HVO and ARBH fought over control of these territories. Control at the end of the war is reflected in the census data from 2013.
Both maps, though, are necessary to understanding the post-war situation. The municipality is a self-governing level in B&H, but the settlement, as village or ward (mesna zajednica) within a municipality also has some governing powers locally. Thus while Croat political parties are dominant in the municipalities in question, there are settlements in which Bosniaks are dominant.
This intermixture means that some locations remain critical, in terms of potential control over the region. One such location is the village of Kaćuni (outlined) in Busovača municipality:
Kaćuni has the largest Bosniak population of any village in the municipality, and as the map shows, it disrupts the continuity of the Croat settlements. During the war, Kaćuni was between two major Croat enclaves and was a base for Bosniak forces.
We think that the strategic nature of the village accounts for the construction after the war of a very large mosque with two minarets, a style of mosque unknown in B&H until 2009 [hyperlink to “Two minaret mosques” gallery], and now found in places of strategic importance. This new mosque was constructed even though the older one had not been destroyed and as of 2022 was still standing next to the new mosque, as seen below:
Kaćuni mosques, new (left) and old, July 2022.
Photo by Robert M. Hayden, © 2024.
New churches as well as mosques are statements of local power. Farther south from Kaćuni on the road to Kiseljak is the village of Gromiljak, which remained under Croat control during the war. Bosniaks have returned to the neighboring village of Gomionica, but built a new mosque on the main road, in the north end of Gromiljak, and close to the Catholic church there built in 1895, which survived the war. The response by Croats was to build a new church, with a high bell tower, across the road from the old one, with a monument to the killed Defenders of the HVO between the new church and new mosque.
Gromiljak, Kiseljak municipality,2022: new Roman Catholic church (left), monument to HVO Defenders between church and 2004 mosque. Photos by Robert M. Hayden, © 2024
In this case, the new religious buildings are contesting manifestations of local dominance but the HVO memorial demonstrates Croat dominance in the village.
3. Ethnic Archipelagoes
We refer to this pattern of intermingled ethno-national territories on varying scales as forming Bosniak, Croat and Serb ethnic archipelagoes. Each such territory is seen as an island, though in the analogy, the large concentration of Croats in the southeastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the Sava to the north, might be seen as parts of a Croat ethnic mainland since they border parts of Croatia populated largely by Croats. Similarly, parts of the Serb archipelago on the eastern border of Bosnia and Herzegovina might be regarded as part of a Serb ethnic mainland since they border parts of Serbia that are populated mainly by Serbs. The Croat archipelago is smallest in total territory and most dispersed, and thus can illustrate the phenomenon well, as shown here:
The ethnic Croat archipelago in Bosnia & Herzegovina 2013 (left), Interspersed with Bosniak and Serb archipelagoes (right)
While water defines the perimeters of islands as that term is most commonly used, what defines the perimeters of ethnic islands are territories controlled by another ethnic or national community. Thus in the analogy we are drawing, the “sea” in which each ethnic island is located is comprised of the territory of one or both of the other two communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
A physical sea and a social one share important characteristics in regard to the constant need to manage possible impediments to the interactions of people living on the islands they define. In aquatic environments the water surrounding islands is crossed mainly by boats; on land, motor vehicles serve that purpose. Both kinds of “seas” impede travel, thus trade and communication, between the people living on The ethnic Croat archipelago in Bosnia & Herzegovina 2013 (left), Interspersed with Bosniak and Serb archipelagoes (right) islands and those on other islands or on a mainland, and while these impediments are often routinely overcome they can at times be quite obstructive, either because of natural events (e.g. hurricanes on the water, landslides on the land) or because of social actions. In addition, these intervening “seas” can impede the development or operation of infrastructural systems such as electrical or water networks, as well as the jurisdictional limits of cell phone providers.
What we have found is that the intertwined ethnic archipelagoes of Bosnia and Herzegovina are linked by multiple infrastructures. Some of these infrastructures facilitate free travel between the territories of each community, others enable easy economic activity between everyone in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as ease of communication. Even some of the infrastructures that are divided legally and operationally as being ethnic-linked are sufficiently interconnected to form components of systems that operate throughout the country, and even more widely. Thus we have found the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, living as they are mainly in separate ethno-territories, to be bound together by common infrastructures. We see them as forming communities of infrastructure, in part one the level of each ethno-nation, but also on the level of the population of the entire country.
4. Communities of Practical Infrastructures in Bosnia and Herzegovina
a. Facilitation of Travel: the Non-localized Vehicle License Plates
When the war ended in late 1995, vehicles in Bosnia and Herzegovina had license plates that identified the town or city in which the vehicle was registered, and most also had been issued by Muslim/Bosniak, Croat or Serb authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus a vehicle was immediately identifiable as likely belonging to a Bosniak, Croat or Serb. Considering the tensions still high in a country just coming out of a civil war, such identifiability of vehicles was undesirable. In early 1998 the international authorities issued regulation for vehicle registration plate to be comprised on only 7 numbers and 2 letters, in a fixed order; and the only letters permitted have the same representation in both the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. Now all vehicles with Bosnia and Herzegovina registrations can be driven anywhere in the country without alerting observers as to the place of registration and thus the likely ethnic identity of the driver.
In our project, we occasionally saw why such anonymity could still be desirable. In our travels we had at times vehicles with registrations in Croatia or Serbia, and while we rarely had problems there were a few occasions in which our researchers felt
uncomfortable in a vehicle so clearly identifiable.
a. Facilitation of economic activity: the common currency
During the war years, in territory controlled by Bosniaks the currency was theBosnian dinar, in Croat-controlled territories the Croatian dinar and after May 1994 the Croatian kuna, in Serb controlled territories the Yugoslav dinar or Republika Srpska dinar. In June 1998 the international authorities imposed a single currency, the Konvertabilna Marka, at a fixed rate of 1 KM to 1 DM, and with the introduction of the Euro, a rate of approximately 2 KM to 1 Euro. Banknotes issued in the FBH carry images of Bosniak or Croat notables of the past, and those in the RS of Serbs, all notes are freely accepted throughout the country, thus enabling freedom of economic exchanges.
Ethnically-linked but integrated infrastructure
c. Three postal systems, linked
Bosnia and Herzegovina may be the only state in the world with three postal systems. BH Pošta (Sarajevo) serves Bosniak-controlled territories in the FBH, Pošta (formerly Hrvatska Pošta Mostar) Croat-controlled areas in the FBH, and Pošta Srpske (Banja Luka), the Republika Srpska. However, these systems are linked so that something mailed from one of them to an address served by another of them will arrive.
d. Cellular Telephone providers
Just as there are three postal systems there are three main cell phone providers: BH Mobile (Sarajevo) M:Tel (Banja Luka) and HT ERONET (Mostar), linked, respectively, to Bosniak territories, Serb territories and the Croat territories. Yet the three systems are interconnected so that calls to any of them within Bosnia and Herzegovina are local calls; this contrasts with the late 1990s, when subscribers to the Serb service were “in roaming” in the FBH ,and those to the Bosniak and Croat services “in roaming” in the RS.
e. Electrodistribution companies
Bosnia and Herzegovina has four power utility companies, as indicated on the map above. As expected one is for Bosniak territories, another for Croat territories, a third for Republika Srpska, and the fourth for Brčko District, a municipality in the north of perhaps 40,000 people, overseen by international representatives. Yet as is true with the telephone providers, the electric grid is linked throughout the country and also with other European states.
f. Major Highways
Bosnia and Herzegovina had no highways before the war or at its end, but they are rapidly being built. The highways connect in the north at Svilaj and Gradiška to the main Croatian highway linking Zagreb with Serbia, N. Macedonia and Greece, , and in the northeast at Rača to the Serbian highway network, leading to Budapest and further north or N. Macedonia and further east.
g. Railroads
Though passenger rail service is very limited, there is a functioning railroad system in Bosnia and Herzegovina that is important for industry and trade. Though the railroad companies are divided between the Federation and the RS, it functions as an integrated system.
h. Conclusion on Communities of Practical Infrastructures
In our research throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina the ethno-territorialization on various levels was visible almost everywhere. Yet also always visible were patterns of quite normal everyday interactions between people belonging to these self- differentiating communities. This did not surprise us – the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina has long been based on such interactions, usually peaceful for long periods of time, but sometimes interrupted by periods of violence when members of the different communities contested for dominance. This is a pattern we have elsewhere termed “antagonistic tolerance.”
What also became clear to us, however, was how very important are the practical infrastructures that facilitate inter communal interaction by enabling travel, economic exchanges and communications without hindrance or even regard to the identities of the people making use of them.
We have thus come to the conclusion that while the overwhelming majority of the population of Bosnia consider themselves to belong to different nations, the existence and increasing spread of the practical infrastructures for travel, communication and economic exchanges lets them function as a community. This community is based on infrastructure, not on ideas of a shared identity as citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, while the practical infrastructures that enable normal interaction have proved successful, the symbolic infrastructures meant to create a common national identity have largely failed, as discussed below.
5. Failures of Symbolic Infrastructures to Unite the Communities
While practical infrastructures connect the ethno-national archipelagoes of Bosnia and Herzegovina and enable normal interactions between their members, international efforts to create unifying symbolic infrastructures have failed, in that they are accepted only by one or two of the communities while being resisted or even rejected by the other(s).
i. State flag:
In early 1998, at about the same time that they created the uniform vehicle registration plates and the konvertabilna marka discussed above, the international administrators in Bosnia – Herzegovina imposed a state flag: While many if not most national flags are comprised of symbols that connect to the heritage of the people(s) living in the state, the new Bosnia and Herzegovina flag was intentionally designed to have no connection at all to the national heritages of Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs, or to any earlier state that had contained Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead, the specific blue and gold colors reflect those of the flag of the European Union, even though Bosnia and Herzegovina has not had a realistic chance of joining that body. The triangle is meant to represent the three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina while also reflecting the shape of the country.
This flag imposed by the international community has been accepted unreservedly by the Bosniaks and to some extent by the Croats but is rarely seen in Republika Srpska except on governmental institutions and at border crossings, where it is required to be flown. Even where it is flown, the official state flag is often accompanied by the flag of the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna (1992-95), or the flag of the Republika Srpska, or the flag of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-
95).
From left: Flags of Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna, Republika Srpska, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
These other flags are especially likely to be flown at the memorials to the war dead, but the usage of them varies, as with so much else, by which community’s dead are commemorated at that site. We have found only one monument simply to all those killed in the war and even that limited to those who were killed in the municipality of Vares. Almost all other monuments are only to Bosniak soldiers and “Martyrs of Islam” (šehidi) of the ARBH, killed defending the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; or to killed “defenders” (branitelji) of the Croatian Homeland, who served in the HVO; or to “fighters” (borci) of the VRS, killed in the Defensive - Fatherland War. Thus three armies in the service of three polities, two of them fighting against inclusion in the Republic of B&H that the third army defended.
As we explain elsewhere on this site [hyperlink], these war memorials are the most clear and reliable indications of which community is dominant in any given location. And the flags displayed make the message instantly clear. Thus ARBH monuments always have the BH state flag, often accompanied by the flag of the 1991-95 Republic of B&H and/ or the flag of the ARBH:
Bosniak memorials, from left: Ustikolina, to ARBH šehidi, BH state flag and flag of wartime Republic of BH; Sanski Most, to Bosniak civilian victims, flag of wartime Republic; Stolac, to ARBH šehidi, BH state flag, flag of ARBH
HVO memorials may or may not fly the BH state flag but will always have the Herzeg-Bosna flag and usually the flag of the HVO:
Croat military memorials (HVO), Vitez (left), Kiseljak (right) BiH flag on one; both have HVO and Herzeg-Bosna flags Photos 2022 by Robert M. Hayden
The VRS did not have a separate flag. Thus monuments to Serbs killed in the war, either civilians or as “fighters” of the VRS, usually display a Republika Srpska flag or a Serb national tricolor, or a flag of veterans of the VRS:
From left: Skelani, monument to Serb victims; Jezero, VRS fighters; Trebinje, central memorial to defenders of Trebinje Photos 2022 by Robert M. Hayden
Thus the Bosnia and Herzegovina state flag has not symbolized a unified state, but rather its differential acceptance by the three main ethno-national communities reinforces their different levels of acceptance of or resistance to a common Bosnia and Herzegovina identity. Meanwhile, the three main communities still fly their own flags, even if they use the state flag.
j. State Anthem
Also imposed by the international administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1999, was a national anthem without lyrics. As with the state flag, reception is varied, most accepted by Bosniaks, least by Serbs, with Croats falling between them.
k. National holidays
The only holidays accepted throughout the country are Jan 1-2 and May 1-2, both of which are secular in origin. Bosniaks and some Croats celebrate Independence on March 1, which is not recognized by Serbs, who celebrate Republic day for the founding of Republika Srpska on January 9 (although this has been proclaimed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of B&H, a decision that has probably increased the day’s popularity in RS); Bosniaks celebrate Statehood Day on Nov 25, referring to a decisiontaken by the Partizans in 1943, while Serbs celebrate the 1995 signing of the Dayton Agreement on Nov 21. Religious holidays vary as well since the Roman Catholic Church adhere to the Gregorian calendar and the Serbian Orthodox Church to the Julian calendar, while Muslims celebrate Muslim holidays.
6. Conclusion
Our research indicates unequivocally that Bosnia and Herzegovina is overwhelmingly divided ethno-territorially, at varying scales. Despite this division, the people(s) of B&H are connected through practical infrastructures that enable them to travel freely, engage in economic activities, communicate easily, and be served by various large infrastructural networks such as an increasing system of highways, electric grids and railroads. Internationally imposed state symbols have failed to gain much acceptance among Serbs and many Croats, yet this failure in symbolism does have much impact on social life. The effective linkage of the population by the practical infrastructures permit this divided population and decentralized state to function, and even maintain stability.
Professor Emeritus of Anthropology & Law, University of Pittsburgh
Associate Professor of Anthropology & Ethnology, University of Zadar